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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 14-1495 
___________ 
 
BYRAN WAYNE MILLER, 
   Petitioner 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
                                         Respondent  
____________________________________ 
 
On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No. A038-203-502) 
Immigration Judge:  Honorable Alberto J. Riefkohl 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
July 15, 2014 
 
Before: FISHER, VANASKIE and ALDISERT, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: July 17, 2014) 
___________ 
 
OPINION 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
Petitioner Byran Miller, a native and citizen of Jamaica, seeks review of a final 
order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirming the Immigration Judge’s (IJ) 
order sustaining the charges of removability and denying protection under the 
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Convention Against Torture (CAT).  For the reasons that follow, we will deny the 
petition for review. 
 Miller entered the United States in 1983 as a lawful resident, and remained so until 
the time of his removal proceedings.  His wife and five children are all United States 
citizens.  From 1991 through 2002, Miller was convicted in New Jersey of several 
crimes, including possession of a controlled dangerous substance (marijuana) with intent 
to distribute on or near a school property.  In 2012, as a result of his convictions, Miller 
was placed in removal proceedings.  The IJ determined that Miller was an aggravated 
felon and that he had committed a “particularly serious crime.”  Miller then applied for 
relief under the CAT.   
 The basis of Miller’s CAT claim stems from a robbery in the United States in 
1999, in which he was the victim.  Miller asserted that the perpetrators of the robbery, 
who were allegedly convicted and, later, deported to Jamaica, would harm him in 
retaliation if he returned to Jamaica.  He further maintained that the authorities in Jamaica 
would be “incapable [of preventing] or complicit” in allowing the perpetrators to harm 
him.  The IJ determined that Miller’s application for CAT relief was “based on an 
extremely vague and almost invisible thread of subjective fear” which was unsupported 
by objective evidence.  More importantly, the IJ noted, there was no evidence that the 
Jamaican authorities would be unable to protect Miller from harm.  The IJ thus denied his 
CAT application and ordered Miller removed.  The BIA affirmed on appeal, and Miller 
timely petitioned for review. 
 Where, as here, an alien is removable due to a controlled substance offense under 
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8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B), our review is limited to “constitutional claims or questions of 
law.”  8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D).  Because Miller appears pro se before the Court as an 
immigration petitioner, the need to construe his claims broadly is “accentuate[d].”  See 
Higgs v. Att’y Gen., 655 F.3d 333, 340 (3d Cir. 2011).  Even construing Miller’s brief 
liberally, however, he fails to present any cognizable argument challenging the reasoning 
of the Board’s decision.  As the Government correctly notes, he has therefore waived 
review of the agency’s determinations that he was removable as an aggravated felon, and 
that he failed to demonstrate eligibility for relief under the CAT.  See United States v. 
Pelullo, 399 F.3d 197, 222 (3d Cir. 2005) (finding that issues not sufficiently argued in 
the briefs are generally considered waived on appeal).
1
   
 Miller raises only one argument in his brief -- that he received ineffective 
assistance of counsel at the immigration proceedings.  We have jurisdiction to review this 
claim.  See Fadiga v. Att’y Gen., 488 F.3d 142, 155 (3d Cir. 2007) (noting that 
ineffective assistance of counsel in a deportation proceeding may be a denial of due 
process).  Miller argues generally that his counsel failed to challenge and/or present 
evidence.  He raised a similar claim on appeal to the BIA; the Board rejected the 
argument finding that Miller had failed to comply with the procedural requirements for 
establishing an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.  See In re Lozada, 19 I. & N. Dec. 
637, 638 (BIA 1988); see also Xu Yong Lu v. Ashcroft, 259 F.3d 127, 133 (3d Cir. 2001) 
                                              
1
 We note that a review of the record suggests an exercise of our discretionary 
power to address issues that have been waived is not warranted.  See Bagot v. Ashcroft, 
398 F.3d 252, 256 (3d Cir. 2005).   
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(concluding that the BIA’s ineffectiveness test is not an abuse of the Board’s discretion).   
Miller does not identify any error in the Board’s ruling, and, even assuming he had, his 
argument would not prevail, as he wholly failed to comply with the Lozada requirements.  
See Fadiga, 488 F.3d at 155 (noting that the Lozada requirements are a “threshold” to 
obtaining consideration of ineffective assistance claims). 
  Based on the foregoing, we will deny the petition for review. 
